T his pa per a i ms t o a nal yze t he fea t ures of Russian/Soviet and G erman policy towards Afghanistan in 1919–1939. Despite political and ideological differences, those two states solved complicated and even similar tasks of entering the new world order. Russia (then USSR) benefitted from her favorable geographic location and ambitions of the Afghan elite to strengthen the sovereignty of the country, whereas Germany emphasized its creed as ‘the third force’, driven by desire to help Afghanistan speed up economic progress, and exploited the idea of «Arian brotherhood» of the Germans and Afghans. The Afghan leaders also used the benefits of country’s location as crossroads of cultures, trade routes and areas of influence of the great powers, but they failed to resist their growing interference and rivalry. What is more, they did not manage to solve the problem of power and sustainable governance in accordance with challenges of the twentieth century. By the end of period under study USSR had stabilized the situation on the Afghan border (wiping out Central Asian insurgents, and earlier concluding the neutrality treaty), whereas Germany had gained the role of most privileged partner, providing the Afghan government with economical and financial aid, and expanding cultural and educational cooperation that took into account traditional values of Asian society.